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NO. 60 DECEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Problematic Prospects for 
US-Turkish Ties in the Biden Era 
Human Rights, Sanctions Likely among Early Tests 
Alan Makovsky 
Minimal discussion of foreign policy during the US presidential campaign has left 
President-elect Joe Biden pinned to very few specific foreign policy positions and 
given him great flexibility in carrying out his program. He would probably prefer 
to avoid confrontation with Turkey; in fact, he will likely explore areas of potential 
US-Turkish cooperation, especially against Russia. However, Biden’s core positions 
on human rights and rule of law, his long-time focus on Aegean and Eastern Mediter-
ranean issues, and his seeming inclination to continue to fight ISIS in cooperation 
with the Syrian-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia – deemed “terrorists” 
by Ankara – probably augur deepening difficulties in US-Turkish ties. Down the line, 
a make-or-break decision on the future of US-Turkish ties will likely hinge on the 
Biden Administration’s assessment of Turkish-Russian relations. Europe may have 
an important say on Biden’s Turkish policy; a senior Biden adviser has said the new 
president will coordinate his approach to Turkey with the European Union. 
 
In a now-famous interview with the New 
York Times late last year, President-elect 
Biden – then one of many candidates 
vying for the Democratic Party’s presiden-
tial nomination – spoke with unbridled 
harshness about Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. He called Erdoğan “an 
autocrat” and, remarkably, threatened to 
work to replace him, quickly adding that 
he meant not by a military coup but by sup-
porting the political opposition – as if a 
foreign government’s open support for an 
elected leader’s opposition were somehow 
perfectly normal. Biden added, without 
specificity, that Erdoğan “must pay a price.” 
The interview took place in December 
2019 and was published in January, but in 
Turkey, oddly, it only saw the light of day 
in mid-August, on the eve of the Democratic 
Party’s nominating convention. Once pub-
licized, the interview provoked a firestorm 
in Turkey. 
Presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin 
accused Biden of “pure ignorance, arro-
gance and hypocrisy,” adding, “The days of 
ordering Turkey around are over. But if you 
still think you can try, be our guest.” Also 
without specificity, he warned Biden, “You 
will pay the price.” 
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Biden and Erdoğan have a rocky personal 
history, and this flare-up convinced many 
analysts that heightened US-Turkish tensions 
are inevitable once Biden, itching for a fight, 
takes office. 
Heightened tensions probably are inevi-
table, but not for the reasons suggested by 
Biden’s New York Times interview. 
Biden the Cautious 
It is highly unlikely that Biden would fol-
low through on the threat to support 
Erdoğan’s opposition, whatever that would 
mean. Instead, the interview should be 
chalked up to a mixture of “tough-guy” 
campaign talk aimed at a highly unpopular 
foreign leader, genuine exasperation with 
Erdoğan’s anti-democratic behavior, and 
anger over Turkey’s then recent invasion of 
northeast Syria, conducted with the Trump 
Administration’s acquiescence. 
Biden is generally cautious in foreign 
policy, not at all quick on the trigger. True, 
he advocated for US intervention in Bosnia 
for humanitarian reasons and, probably 
reluctantly, voted for the 2003 Iraq War. 
As vice-president, however, Biden was most 
often a source of restraint. In Barack Obama’s 
inner councils, he is reliably reported to 
have opposed the US intervention against 
Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi and the surge in 
Afghanistan, as well the audacious opera-
tion that took out Osama Bin Laden – the 
first two because he questioned the value 
to US national interests, the last because 
he feared a problematic failure. He was also 
on the losing side of an internal debate on 
whether to push Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak to resign during “Arab Spring” 
demonstrations in February 2011. 
In fact, despite a range of differences he 
will likely have with the Turkish govern-
ment – some of which have their origins 
in the Obama Administration – it is dif-
ficult to imagine the circumspect Biden 
openly seeking confrontation with Turkey, 
unless provoked. One of Biden’s first for-
eign-policy initiatives is likely to be an ef-
fort to patch up relations with North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, badly 
frayed by four years of neglect, even hos-
tility, under the Trump Administration – 
and Turkey is still one of those allies. 
Biden’s Values Replace Trump’s 
Regardless of Biden’s likely intent not to 
roil further the troubled US-Turkish rela-
tionship he will inherit, it is a virtual 
certainty that things will get worse almost 
immediately upon Biden’s taking office. 
Simply by being himself – his commit-
ment to human rights abroad and rule of 
law at home forming much of the core 
of his political being – three changes are 
likely to come quickly in US policy as it 
affects Ankara, and all in a manner un-
welcome to the Turkish government. 
First of all, Biden is likely to return 
human rights to a central focus of US foreign 
policy. This will be a change not merely of 
degree but of kind. President Donald Trump 
did not believe in raising human-rights 
issues, except in rare circumstances. In fact, 
Trump often praised Erdoğan for his effec-
tiveness in governing his nation. Trump 
paid little mind to Turkey’s broad range 
of human rights transgressions – whether 
repression of free speech, unjust arrests of 
journalists and political opponents, removal 
of legitimately elected Kurdish mayors, or 
the embarrassing laws against “insulting 
the president,” which have resulted in tens 
of thousands of prosecutions. 
In contrast, Biden’s 2020 Democratic 
Party platform vows to “put democratic 
values at the core of our foreign policy.” 
The United States, Biden says, will host a 
global “Summit for Democracy” during the 
first year of his Administration, which will 
prioritize “fighting corruption, defending 
against authoritarianism, and advancing 
human rights,” and will, inter alia, “honestly 
confront nations that are backsliding.” In 
addition to governments, the summit is en-
visioned to include civil society organiza-
tions “that stand on the frontlines in defense 
of democracy” – the type whose leaders 
are regularly harassed or imprisoned in Tur-
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key. Moreover, the platform vows to “hold 
to account those who perpetrate human 
rights abuses.” None of this is music to 
Erdoğan’s ears. Erdoğan knows that such 
bold rhetoric from Washington is likely 
to embolden Turkish dissenters. 
Second, Biden will return to a traditional 
“hands off” approach regarding US Depart-
ment of Justice prosecutions. That means 
that the Southern District of New York 
almost certainly will continue to prosecute 
its case against Halkbank, a Turkish state 
bank accused of helping Iran circumvent 
US sanctions to the tune of possibly tens 
of billions of dollars. An almost inevitable 
guilty verdict could result in a major fine 
that threatens the bank’s viability and 
damages Turkey’s teetering economy. The 
New York Times recently detailed President 
Trump’s vigorous, but failed, efforts to shut 
down that prosecution. 
Third, on the unavoidable near-term 
agenda, and perhaps most immediately, are 
Congressionally mandated sanctions flow-
ing from Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 air 
defense system from Russia. Exploiting a 
loophole in the law, Trump simply ignored 
it, protecting Turkey from sanctions. Given 
bipartisan Congressional demand for its 
implementation, it seems unlikely that 
Biden would do likewise. 
The relevant sanctions legislation is 
known as the Countering America’s Adver-
saries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), 
passed in 2017. It requires the president to 
impose sanctions on any nation that con-
ducts a “significant transaction” with Rus-
sia’s defense or intelligence sectors. CAATSA 
sets out a menu of 12 different sanctions, 
with a range of impact, from which the 
president is directed to choose at least five. 
Biden probably is not eager to impose 
sanctions, which would poison his relations 
with Erdoğan and could have a devastating 
effect on Turkey’s fragile economy. Still, 
he may have little choice. Biden is unlikely 
to ignore the law as Trump did. He may 
choose to impose the five least harsh sanc-
tions, which is well within the law, but it 
is almost inevitable that he will implement 
the law and sanction Turkey in some fashion 
unless Ankara disposes of its S-400s to 
Washington’s satisfaction. A waiver is pos-
sible, but Biden would pursue that course 
only if he can persuade a consensus in Con-
gress of its wisdom. 
Problems Likely to Fester: 
YPG, Gülen 
Regarding what Ankara considers the two 
most neuralgic issues in US-Turkish rela-
tions – US cooperation with the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK)-associated YPG against 
ISIS in northeastern Syria, and the presence 
of 79-year-old Fethullah Gülen in the United 
States – there is unlikely to be much 
change. Neither the Obama or Trump Jus-
tice Departments have felt there is suffi-
cient evidence to warrant an extradition 
case against Gülen. Meanwhile, Biden’s 
support for the US relationship with the 
YPG is clear. He savaged Trump for pulling 
back US troops and allowing Turkish troops 
to enter northeast Syria and displace the 
Kurds. Unless Trump withdraws the 500 
or so remaining US troops from Syria prior 
to January 20, Biden will almost certainly 
leave them in place. The Democratic plat-
form promises to pursue ISIS in Syria, while 
“stand(ing) by Kurdish and other critical 
partners in that fight.” And, of course, it 
was the Obama-Biden Administration that 
began the relationship with the YPG. 
In recent times, Turkey has not raised 
either the Gülen or the YPG issues as fre-
quently or as forcefully as in the past. 
Regarding Gülen, Ankara may have come 
to recognize the futility of its extradition 
demand, although Erdoğan will not discard 
the talking point. As for the YPG, it may 
loom somewhat less large these days; three 
Turkish military operations since 2016 have 
succeeded in pushing the YPG off most of the 
Turkish-Syrian border. Still, Erdoğan recently 
threatened further military action against 
the YPG in northeast Syria, which could 
prove to be an early test of Biden’s resolve. 
Even absent further Turkish military 
threats or action, the United States’ rela-
tionship with the YPG will continue to sour 
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bilateral relations with Ankara. Biden will 
probably pursue a belated effort begun 
under Trump to fashion a coalition of the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD), the political 
arm of the YPG, with other Syrian Kurdish 
groups more acceptable to Ankara; success 
in that effort is at best a long shot, however. 
Old Issues, New Attention: Cyprus, 
Eastern Mediterranean, Hamas 
There are other enduring Turkey-related 
issues where Biden may make an imme-
diate difference, or at least strike a notice-
ably different tone than did Trump. One 
is Cyprus. Whereas the Cyprus problem 
makes many observers’ eyes glaze, Biden 
has a longstanding interest in the Cyprus 
problem, forged by his memory of the 
origins of that problem and shaped in sig-
nificant part by his traditional closeness 
with the Hellenic-American community. 
He is one of only two still-active politicians 
who participated in the vote on the arms 
embargo that the US Congress placed on 
Turkey following the 1974 Turkish invasion 
of Cyprus; he supported it. Reflecting his 
personal interest, he visited Cyprus as vice-
president in 2014, the highest-ranking US 
official to do so since Vice-President Lyndon 
Johnson in 1962. Over the years as a Sena-
tor, he frequently crossed swords with 
Turkish officials regarding the Cyprus issue. 
Efforts to reunite the divided but peace-
ful island would normally rank low among 
any new president’s immediate priorities. It 
will not be a priority for Biden, either, but 
he knows the issue well and is invested in 
it. He will want renewed talks on reunifica-
tion between the Greek Cypriots and the 
Turkish Cypriots. And he will be sensitive 
to Turkish efforts to upset the status quo, 
as Erdoğan has recently done by partially 
opening Varosha and declaring that the 
only solution for Cyprus is “two states for 
two peoples,” contrary to longstanding 
efforts at unification. Should Erdoğan insist 
on this approach, there will inevitably be 
tension with Washington, both at the White 
House and in Congress. 
Related to this – and like the Trump 
and Obama Administrations – Biden will 
firmly object to active Turkish efforts to 
explore for hydrocarbons in waters that 
constitute the Greek and Cypriot Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) as well as in waters 
in the Aegean that the US considers dis-
puted between Turkey and Greece. How-
ever, Biden is likely to express his objec-
tions more consistently and more forcefully 
than did his predecessors. If Turkey never-
theless persists in its explorations, it will 
find itself in a crisis with Washington. If 
Turkey stands down, Ankara probably will 
find Biden balanced in his approach to 
Greek-Turkish relations. 
Biden is also likely to want to build on 
the United States’ growing security ties with 
Greece, albeit without destabilizing Greek-
Turkish relations. Likewise, he will unques-
tionably support the burgeoning Greek-
Israeli-Cypriot “alliance,” while working 
closely with it to try to ensure that it is not 
seen as too provocative in wary Ankara. 
Another longstanding, potentially prob-
lematic issue involves Turkish ties to Hamas, 
which the United States and the European 
Union (EU) label a terrorist group. Turkey 
has had open relations with Hamas since 
February 2006, about which the United 
States has remained largely silent. Only with 
a senior Hamas visit to Ankara three-plus 
months ago – the latest of many such 
visits – did the US State Department criti-
cize Turkey-Hamas ties for the first time. 
Ankara indignantly rejected the criticism. 
In recent years, with mounting Israeli 
accusations that Hamas is actually planning 
terrorist operations from Turkish soil – not 
merely hosting an office – it seems likely 
that the pro-Israel Biden Administration as 
well as the US Congress will pointedly raise 
this issue. 
The “Russia-Turkey” Issues: Syria/ 
Idlib, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh 
There are three sets of issues in which Tur-
key and Russia are arrayed on opposite 
sides: Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. 
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In all three cases, Turkey’s military involve-
ment was the result of independent deci-
sion-making, without any known consul-
tation with the United States or other NATO 
allies. In all three cases, Turkey and Russia 
are either discussing possible solutions, 
cooperating to maintain stability in the 
interim, or both. 
There is a split in the US policy world 
over how to view this multi-front clash. 
Some see a NATO ally counterbalancing 
Russian aggression; those who see it this 
way tend to think that common opposition 
to Russia can be the basis for reviving falter-
ing US-Turkish ties. Others see Turkey as 
“out of control” and moving toward part-
nering with Moscow in a condominium 
that encompasses increasing portions of 
the Mediterranean and Black Seas regions. 
From the latter perspective, the growing 
number of fields of Russian-Turkish com-
petition actually lead to more Russian-
Turkish bilateral coordination, and thus 
to stronger Russian-Turkish ties, pushing 
Turkey further away from the Western 
orbit – and, as some see it, that is exactly 
what Ankara wants. 
The former view was epitomized by US 
Ambassador James Jeffrey, who, until last 
month, served as Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo’s Special Representative for Syria 
Engagement and the Special Envoy to the 
Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS. Following 
Turkish clashes in February with Russian 
and Syrian troops in Idlib, Syria, Jeffrey 
publicly praised Turkey’s role in Idlib and 
spoke of common US-Turkish geostrategic 
interests in Libya, meaning as a counter-
weight to Russia. He went so far as to refer 
to Turkish troops killed in a Russian bomb-
ing raid as “our martyrs.” Jeffrey spoke of 
the possibility of material US or NATO sup-
port for Turkey’s military mission in Syria, 
but that was not forthcoming – probably 
because of privately expressed Congression-
al resistance. 
Under Trump, issues involving Russia 
were always complicated by the president’s 
mysterious warmth toward Russian Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin. By contrast, Biden 
takes a transparently harsh view of Russian 
intentions toward the United States. Shortly 
before the US election, Biden labeled Russia 
“the biggest threat to America right now in 
terms of breaking up our security and our 
alliances.” 
For now, it is not clear if Biden views 
Turkey as more an asset or an impediment 
in the US competition with Russia. In state-
ments made before the US election, Biden 
tilted heavily in favor of Armenia, calling 
Turkish military involvement “irresponsi-
ble” and calling for a cutoff of the United 
States’ limited military assistance to Azer-
baijan. Biden has not addressed the Idlib 
situation, where the Turkish-Russian face-
off is most direct. Nor has he addressed the 
internal military situation in Libya. 
Libya is the most complex of the three 
situations. Multiple US allies are on each 
side of the conflict: Turkey and Italy sup-
port the UN- (and US-)recognized Govern-
ment of National Accord (GNA) under Fayez 
al-Sarraj; France, Egypt, the United Arab 
Emirates, and other pro-US Arab states join 
Russia in backing rebel Khalifa Haftar’s 
Libyan National Army. The issue is further 
complicated by the fact that the GNA, in 
exchange for crucial Turkish military sup-
port, recognized Turkey’s expansive EEZ 
claims in the Mediterranean – claims that 
trespass on Greece’s internationally recog-
nized claims. 
The Trump Administration divided 
Turkey’s Libya intervention into two parts, 
criticizing the maritime agreement but, 
at least initially, projecting approval of the 
intervention on behalf of the Sarraj govern-
ment. Biden no doubt likewise disapproves 
of the maritime claims, but it is not clear 
what his view will be regarding Turkish 
military involvement, which is unquestion-
ably the GNA’s life-support system. 
Michael Carpenter, a leading Biden 
adviser on Europe, recently characterized 
Turkey’s intervention in Libya – as well 
as its actions in Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
Aegean and its purchase of the S400 – as 
acting “irresponsibly and aggressively in 
undermining our shared interests.” Regard-
ing Libya, Carpenter did not specify whether 
he was objecting only to the maritime 
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agreement or to the military intervention 
as well. 
Somewhere amidst the Russian-Turkish-
US triangle sits Ukraine, with which Turkey 
appears to be developing increasingly close 
relations. Turkey last year sold Ukraine six 
of its domestically-produced combat drones 
and has been unwaveringly critical of the 
Russian occupation of Crimea, certainly a 
plus for the United States and its allies. But 
Turkey and Ukraine have also reportedly 
signed agreements calling for cooperation 
on dozens of military projects, including 
development of an aircraft engine. This 
could be a dramatic boost to Turkey’s ex-
panding military-industrial sector, a major 
source of its new-found foreign-policy inde-
pendence – and thus perhaps, in the view 
of its NATO allies, an undesirable develop-
ment. 
Biden ultimately will decide whether 
Turkey is seeking to act more as an asset or 
an impediment to US interests in Washing-
ton’s own confrontation with Russia, and 
that will go a long way toward determining 
whether a serious improvement in US-Turk-
ish ties is possible. But Biden is unlikely to 
reach a positive determination about Tur-
key unless Washington and Ankara come 
to an accommodation regarding the S-400s. 
Pragmatism Trumps Problematic 
Personal History 
It is no secret that Erdoğan was rooting 
hard for Trump’s reelection. His relation-
ship with Biden has been as rocky as his 
relationship with Trump has been warm. 
Erdoğan was famously one of the last for-
eign leaders to congratulate Biden on his 
victory. 
For one thing, Biden served in the US 
Administration that Erdoğan seems to 
believe devised the 2016 coup that sought 
to overthrow him. While there is no evi-
dence that the United States had prior 
knowledge of – much less planned – the 
coup attempt, Süleyman Soylu, a top Erdo-
ğan cabinet member, accused the United 
States of being its architect, and it is un-
likely that he spoke without the boss’ bless-
ing. Washington indeed was inexplicably 
slow to condemn the coup. Biden may bear 
an unfair share of the brunt of Erdoğan’s 
anger regarding the US response to the 
coup, as it was he whom Obama designated 
to visit Turkey and patch things up – a 
full five weeks after the coup attempt took 
place. During the visit, Biden felt constrained 
to apologize for the belated US response. 
It was not Biden’s first apology to Erdo-
ğan. In 2014, Biden publicly apologized 
after Erdoğan reacted heatedly to state-
ments Biden made in an appearance at Har-
vard’s Kennedy School. Biden provoked 
Erdoğan’s anger by claiming that Turkey 
had armed “anyone who would fight” Bashar 
al-Assad – clearly meaning jihadists – 
and that Erdoğan had acknowledged to the 
Obama Administration that Turkey had 
allowed too many jihadists to pass through 
its territory into Syria. Erdoğan denied both 
claims. 
Biden and Erdoğan certainly have more 
than a passing acquaintance. Including the 
post-coup trip, Biden visited Turkey four 
times as vice-president. During a visit in 
January 2016, Biden publicly criticized 
Turkey’s democratic backsliding, defended 
Turkish academics under fire for signing a 
petition opposing Turkey’s Kurdish policies, 
and made a point of holding public meet-
ings with journalists fired for criticizing the 
government as well as with the wife of an 
imprisoned prominent journalist. That was 
another occasion on which Biden angered 
Erdoğan, but, that time, there was no 
apology. 
From Erdoğan’s perspective, Biden has 
been on the wrong side of almost every 
issue of importance to Turkey. In addition 
to his sympathy with Greece and Greek 
Cypriots and his backing of the US partner-
ship with the YPG, Biden has indicated sup-
port for the recognition of the Armenian 
Genocide and is a long-time booster of the 
Iraqi Kurds and their Kurdistan Regional 
Government. In 2017, Biden ruefully blamed 
deference to Turkish sensibilities for the 
fact that, as vice-president, he did not do 
“more for the Kurds.” 
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According to former Obama adviser Ben 
Rhodes, in White House meetings Biden 
would “repeatedly” assert that his long 
experience had taught him that “all foreign 
policy is an extension of personal relation-
ships.” If that is the case – and, fortunately, 
it is not – it would seem that US-Turkish 
relations under Biden will have a steep hill 
to climb. Both Biden and Erdoğan are prag-
matists, however; personal history might 
play a role, but issues mostly will determine 
the course of bilateral ties. 
Despite these tensions, Biden seems to 
think he has at least somewhat of a rapport 
with the Turkish leader. In the same inter-
view in which he labeled Erdoğan an “auto-
crat,” Biden also boasted that he was Erdo-
ğan’s preferred interlocutor in the Obama 
Administration because the Turkish leader 
trusted that he “wasn’t anti-Islam.” 
Foreign Policy: 
Biden’s Comfort Zone 
To be sure, Biden’s primary preoccupations 
upon taking office will be domestic – pri-
marily, the pandemic and the economy. 
However, it is wrong to think Biden will 
leave foreign policy on the back-burner for 
long, if at all. Trump has left behind many 
problems (not all of his own making), and 
foreign policy is a realm in which a US 
president can make a quick difference – 
unlike the slog of passing legislation through 
Congress, especially one that may be divided. 
Foreign policy is also a realm in which 
Biden feels particularly comfortable. 
Biden will come to office with the most 
foreign-affairs experience, and foreign 
contacts, of any US president since George 
Bush pere. A former chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Biden is a 
classic internationalist, strongly supportive 
of NATO and all the other post–World War 
II multilateral institutions that Trump 
demeans. And, unlike the more isolationist 
Trump, he believes US leadership is vital 
for international stability and prosperity, as 
well as for the United States’ own national 
interests. He set out his views in that regard 
during the campaign in a Foreign Affairs 
article entitled, tellingly, “Why America 
Must Lead Again.” 
Accordingly, Biden’s Administration is 
far more likely than Trump’s to anticipate 
and avert potential crises and manage them 
effectively when they arise. This proposi-
tion will be tested over time, of course, 
but one can assume that in circumstances 
where US allies are on the verge of hostil-
ities, as has happened in Libya and quite 
recently in the Aegean, the Biden Admin-
istration will not leave it to Europeans 
alone to calm things down. 
Biden’s Braintrust 
Given his long experience in the region, 
Biden will feel fully at ease making the final 
call on decisions related to Turkey. And, 
based on their writings and public state-
ments, Biden’s top foreign-policy advisers 
– Secretary of State-designate Antony 
Blinken and National Security Adviser-
designate Jake Sullivan – will mainly re-
inforce Biden’s own instincts. 
Probably no previous US Secretary of 
State has come to office with as much 
knowledge and experience about Turkey as 
will Blinken. As Senior Director for Euro-
pean Affairs at the National Security Coun-
cil, Blinken was President Bill Clinton’s 
point-man on Turkey in the late 1990s. 
He joined Biden’s staff in the US Senate in 
2002 and – as Biden’s chief foreign-policy 
adviser in the Senate and the vice-presi-
dency, then later as deputy secretary of 
state – has been engaged with Turkey ever 
since. Blinken is the only person to have 
accompanied both Clinton on his success-
ful, nearly week-long visit to Turkey in 
1999 and Biden on his awkward, post-coup-
attempt visit in 2016. 
Both Blinken and Sullivan have acknowl-
edged Turkey’s importance to the United 
States and called for intense engagement 
with Ankara to address the many difficulties 
besetting bilateral ties, while also express-
ing concern and skepticism about Erdoğan’s 
long-term foreign-policy direction. 
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Both have also expressed views, prior 
to the campaign, that probably rankled in 
Ankara. Writing in the New York Times in 
2017, Blinken called on President Trump 
to arm the YPG as the United States’ most 
effective partner against ISIS. At the same 
time, he showed awareness of Turkish con-
cerns by calling, inter alia, for the United 
States to support a Turkish buffer-zone in 
northern Syria, increase its support for 
Turkey against the PKK, and push the YPG 
to dissociate itself from the PKK. In a 
2018 Politico oped co-authored with former 
US Ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman and 
focused on the then-prevalent concern that 
Turkey might make good on Erdoğan’s 
threats to attack US troops in Syria, the 
authors called for a “tough-minded and 
transactional approach” to bilateral ties, 
including consideration of sanctions, while 
also advocating “sustained, high-level dia-
logue.” 
Biden’s Challenge: Changing 
Turkey’s Course While Preserving 
US-Turkish Ties 
The United States may be increasingly 
focused on Asia these days, but Biden also 
will want to resuscitate relations with the 
country’s European allies. Nor is he likely 
to neglect the Middle East, which has such 
a powerful impact on those allies and in 
which Turkey has such deep interests. 
Europe and the Middle East, including the 
Greece–Turkey–Cyprus nexus, are the 
regions Biden knows best. And tensions 
with Turkey, Biden aide Carpenter says, 
“will require a lot of attention at the very 
start [emphasis added] of the next Admin-
istration,” so Turkish issues are hardly 
likely to be neglected. 
Notwithstanding his close relationships 
in the Hellenic world, Biden has always 
been pragmatic, and he is appreciative of 
Turkey’s geostrategic value. As president, 
Biden will certainly not go out of his way 
to antagonize Ankara, at least from his own 
perspective, although Ankara may see some 
of his positions as unnecessarily antagonis-
tic. He will seek to alter Turkey’s course, 
both domestically and externally, and he 
will do so – according to Carpenter – 
“in coordination with the EU.” But Biden 
and his Administration will face what has 
become a perennial problem: How to change 
Turkey’s behavior without devastating its 
economy or causing – in the words of Tur-
key analyst Nicholas Danforth – “a per-
manent rupture” in US-Turkish ties. 
Biden will want to preserve a sound 
diplomatic and security relationship with 
Turkey, to the extent possible – but it may 
not be possible. Led by human rights and 
the S-400 purchase, many difficult issues 
are looming. The Biden Administration 
will almost certainly let Turkey know early 
on what is expected of it, along the lines 
suggested in the first part of this paper. Per-
haps it will even consider a senior-level dia-
logue, as Blinken and Sullivan have sug-
gested at times. The wild card will be how 
Erdoğan – now seemingly bent on an 
assertive, nationalist, and independent for-
eign policy and a role as a leading regional 
power, and seeing these ambitions lashed 
to his domestic political prospects – will 
respond. 
It is not what Biden will seek, but further 
deterioration in US-Turkish ties in the early 
months of the Biden Administration seems 
almost inevitable, barring a sudden change 
in Turkey’s domestic and regional posture. 
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